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GENERAL COMMENTS
"Old wine in new bottles" has been used to describe Article 3
on commercial paper. Perhaps this description is more aptly ap-
plied to the commercial paper provisions than to other articles of
the Uniform Commercial Code, for the substantive changes in the
law of negotiable instruments are not extensive.
Usually, the practicing attorney's loudest lament about any
statutory change in existing law is that he must unlearn much of
what he already has mastered. This attitude is based on the assump-
tion that he has a mastery of the subject being tampered with by
legislation. In the area of commercial paper, however, it is sub-
mitted that most practitioners have probably become somewhat rusty
on the refinements of existing law. Such a waning of knowledge is
understandable, for so many legal problems associated with negotia-
ble instruments are resolved in out-of-court settlements, by default
judgments, or by a simple failure of holders of "bad paper" to seek
legal advice. The fact that only about a dozen negotiable instru-
ment cases have reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina
since 1952 is some indication of the paucity of complicated litigation
on the matter.'
* Member of the Virginia Bar and Lecturer in Law at the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary; consultant to
North Carolina Legislative Council for Articles 3, 4 and 5.
'The scarcity of appellate cases could be considered as an indication
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Since the typical reader probably is not conversant with the
existing law of negotiable instruments, he most likely will view
North Carolina's passage of Article 3 not as a threat to his usual
way of doing things but as an opportunity to review briefly a few
somewhat basic rules relating to negotiable instruments in general.
The following commentary is based on this premise.
Though discussion is primarily of basic law, a few comments
will be made on more refined problems for the benefit of readers
interested in the esoteric. Also, an occasional suggestion will be
made for further legislative action that might facilitate collections
of negotiable instruments.
I. THE GENERAL NATURE OF ARTIcLE, 3
Generally, Article 3 is a revision of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law' promulgated by the National Conference on Uni-
form State Laws in 1896 and promptly adopted by North Carolina
in 1899. Though the NIL had been adopted in every state by 1925,
the desired uniformity of law did not materialize in practice. Many
states modified by legislative action various statutory provisions,
and some eighty of the NIL's 198 sections have received conflicting
constructions by the courts.
Briefly stated, the general purposes of Article 3 are:
(1) to reconcile prior inconsistencies by adopting in statutory
form the "best" view of the courts;
(2) to eliminate obsolete provisions of the NIL;
(3) to consolidate the prolix 198 sections of the NIL into
seventy-nine revised sections under Article 3;
(4) to narrow the scope of the provisions by eliminating from
coverage under the modified rules of the NIL certain instruments
that were previously lumped in with commercial paper to form a
nebulous hodgepodge of paper called negotiable instruments; and
(5) to leave to the coverage of Article 4 (bank deposits and
collections) certain specific rules on commercial paper when such
paper is involved in the banking process and the bank-customer
relationship.
that the law of North Carolina is well settled in matters affecting negotiable
instruments. However, the frequency with which other apparently well-
settled matters are appealed argues for the minimum litigation conclusion.2 Hereinafter referred to as the NIL.
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It is appropriate to note that the lawyer's research task will be
immeasurably facilitated by Article 3. While the seventy-nine Code
sections and comments thereon may not answer all questions, they
do give a sound starting point that is far superior to prior statutory
law with its multiple views (views often prompted by insignificant
peculiarities of the facts which made a particular construction ex-
pedient at the time). The law will surely be easier to fifnd, at least
until we again develop a body of new conflicting constructions.
In particular, attention is called to the official comments in the
1962 official text of the Code and the North Carolina comments
compiled for the Legislative Council. While these comments are
not law in themselves, they do set forth changes from prior law,
and in some instances the exact meaning of rather concise statutory
provisions can be determined only by a careful study of the 1962
official comments.
A cautionary word is added here. This writer must take the
responsibility for the North Carolina comments to Articles 3, 4 and
5, and because of the haste necessary in their preparation they
should not be taken as either definitive or final.
In reading the official text and the official comments to the
Code, the reader is forewarned that punctuation is at a minimum.
Clarity at times is achieved by mentally adding an occasional comma
or semicolon. Also, some sections can be better understood by read-
ing the concluding sentences first. As one wag at a recent meeting
put it, "and it sometimes helps to not only reverse the sentence
order, but to read each sentence backwards." Though this is an
obvious overstatement, one may gain new insight into many sections
by experimenting with some rearrangement of words.
II. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 3
Item (4) of the purposes listed above notes that the scope of
Article 3 covering commercial paper is narrower than the existing
coverage of the NIL. This narrowing of coverage is of considerable
importance, and a bit of history will give the proper perspective for
appreciating more fully the "labeling technique" employed in the
past and under the Code.
Fundamentally, a negotiable paper is a species of contract having
legal attributes quite different from other contracts. For example,
the so-called "negotiable instrument" was one that could be assigned
[Vol. 44
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(or negotiated) at a time When the common law frowned on the
assignment of contract rights. Further, the transfer of such paper
could be accomplished with relative ease, i.e., by mere delivery in
the case of bearer paper or an indorsement plus a delivery in the
case of order paper. Also, a subsequent good faith purchaser could
collect on the contract free of defenses existing between prior parties,
this being the subsequent owner's main advantage in being classi-
fied as a holder in due course. In addition to the ease-of-transfer
and freedom-from-defense attributes of a negotiable instrument, such
an instrument occasionally has minor advantages such as ease of
procedure in suit, more liberal rules on interest allowance, and long-
er periods of limitations.
In the following analysis a distinction must be made between
a contract that is negotiable in the sense that it can be easily
negotiated free of defenses, a technical "negotiable instrument," as
that term is used in the NIL, and "a negotiable instrument within
this article," as the term is employed in Article 3. Distinctions
between these three classes of instruments will be made more ap-
parent in later paragraphs.
Prior to the NIL, the laws of non-money negotiable instruments
and the laws of moneyed negotiable instruments were somewhat
different, but they did have the basic similarity of ease of transfer
and freedom from certain defenses when sued on by a bona fide
purchaser.
When the English codified the law of moneyed paper in the Bills
of Exchange Act in 1882, they carefully distinguished between
moneyed and non-moneyed instruments by providing, "Bills, notes
and checks in order to be negotiable ... must be payable in money."
Thus, moneyed paper, (bills, notes and checks), had a special law
of "negotiable instruments"; but non-moneyed paper could be nego-
tiable apart from the Bills of Exchange Act.
Later in the century, when the basic rules of the Bills of Ex-
change Act were adopted by John J. Crawford in his draft of the
NIL, section 1 awkwardly stated, "an instrument to be negotia-
ble... (2) must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay
a sum certain in money." This "an instrument" phraseology has
been descriptively called "Crawford's Blunder," because non-
moneyed paper, such as stocks, interim receipts, warehouse receipts,
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7 (1953).
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and bills of lading that had previously been capable of easy transfer
and freedom from defenses did not meet the "in money" test so as to
be negotiable under the NIL.
The legislatures set to work passing statutes such as the Uni-
form Bills of Exchange Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,
the Uniform Interim Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act in order to give back to non-moneyed papers the ancient
attributes of negotiable paper that the NIL already gave to paper
payable in money.
One class of paper that clearly could come under the NIL's "in
money" requirement is the corporate bond, and for years the nego-
tiability of such investment paper was tested by the detailed defini-
tion of a "negotiable instrument" contained in NIL sections 1 through
10.1 Often, one or more of the usually elaborate provisions of a
corporate bond would cause such bond to fail the tests for nego-
tiability. At times, however, the courts stretched the NIL definition
of a negotiable instrument or construed the terms of the bond in
such a manner as to permit it to be classified as a "negotiable in-
strument" so as to bring into play the beneficial provisions of that
law.
The bond cases are typical of the "classification technique" so
frequently applied by courts and legislatures. For example, instead
of asking whether an innocent purchaser for value of a bearer bond
should be able to hold the bond free of the claims of a prior owner
from whom it has been stolen, the courts tend to become embroiled
in the secondary question of whether some one of the provisions
inserted by the corporate issuer happened not to meet the test of
a "negotiable instrument" laid down by the NIL.
Under the classification technique, if the bond is classified as a
"negotiable instrument," the innocent purchaser for value may be
a holder in due course (hereinafter called an HDC) free from
claims of the original true owner. Conversely, if the bond fails the
NIL test, the same equally innocent purchaser for value is not an
IDC. Consequently, he is subject to the claim of the prior owner
under the bromide that "a thief cannot pass title," or the more
picturesque "title, like a stream, can rise no higher than its source."
While there is a place for such conclusions, they are not really very
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-7 to -16 (1953).
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helpful in deciding who has the better claim to paper that is de-
signed to circulate freely in a Wall Street world.
Fortunately for the investor, corporate bonds are no longer
lumped together with bills, notes and checks under Article 35 In-
stead such investment paper is covered by Code Article 8 on invest-
ment securities. Other types of negotiable paper are covered by
Article 5 (letters of credit) and Article 7 (warehouse receipts,
bills of lading, and other documents of title).
In summary, then, Article 3 is left to cover only drafts, checks,
certificates of deposit and notes. These items are described as com-
mercial paper,' from which the article derives its title.
Turning again to the "labeling game," we find an interesting
new phrase appearing in Code section 3-104(1): "Any writing to be
a negotiable instrument within this article must . . . ."' Here in the
very first substantive section, we find the "old wine," the familiar,
though troublesome, terminology. Even Article 3 with its new name
"Commercial Paper"' continues to call the paper it governs "a nego-
tiable instrument." However, it limits this to "within this Article."
The significance is seen in the official comment: "'within this arti-
cle' in subsection (1) leaves open the possibility that some writings
may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial decision.
The same is true as to any new type of paper which commercial
practice may develop in the future."9 Consequently, it now appears
that in the future the lawyer will be dealing with different kinds
of negotiable or quasi-negotiable paper:
(1) Moneyed or commercial paper that meets the definition
of "'a negotiable instrument within this article," which will be
governed by the express terms of Article 3.
(2) Quasi-negotiable paper in the form of documents of title
to be governed by Article 7.
(3) Quasi-negotiable paper in the form of investment securi-
ties covered by Article 8.
(4) Other court-sanctioned negotiable paper to be governed
by some none-too-certain law.
aG.S. § 25-3-103(1) provides: "This article does not apply to money,
documents of title or investment securities."
' See G.S. § 25-3-104, comment 1.Emphasis added.8 Interestingly, the term "commercial paper" is only generally defined in
G.S. § 25-3-101, comment 1, and it is not defined in the Code proper.
G.S. § 25-3-104(1), comment 1.
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For the last type of paper, the courts revert to the rules of the
law merchant."° However, it is suggested that the courts adopt as
a part of the decisional law of North Carolina the views expressed
in the Code provisions if they are deciding a question involving an
instrument that is for practical purposes the equivalent of "a nego-
tiable instrument within this article."
One such instrument might have been a check that omits the
magic words of negotiability-"order" or "bearer." Technically,
such a check does not come within the definition of Code section
3-104. However, it is not necessary to speculate whether such a
check should be treated by decisional law in approximately the same
way as a technically perfect "negotiable instrument within this arti-
cle." Such check or similar instrument is expressly made subject to
all provisions of Article 3, except that there can be no holder in
due course of such instrument." For the past year or so counter-
checks omitting the words "order" or "bearer" have been in use
in North Carolina. 2
Before moving to an analysis of individual provisions of Article
3, it is important to note the intimate relationship between it and
Article 4 (bank collections and deposits).
Whenever commercial paper covered by Article 3 finds its way
into the bank deposit and collection process, it is necessary to con-
sider both Articles 3 and 4. To the extent of any conflict between
the two, the specific provisions of Article 4 prevail over the more
general provisions of Article 3.11
The close relationship between Articles 3 and 4, however, does
not necessarily mean that every moneyed paper that gets into the
hands of a bank will be subject to both articles. For example, Arti-
cle 4 applies to moneyed paper that may not be a negotiable instru-
ment within the definition of Code section 3-104. Also, some com-
mercial paper covered by Article 3 may be in the hands of a bank
other than as a part of the deposit and collection process. In this
latter case, only the rules of Article 3 apply.
1 G.S. § 25-1-103 permits the law merchant to be followed unless dis-
placed by some provision of chapter 25 of the General Statutes.
11 G.S. § 25-3-805.
" The presence of such checks may be explained by the fact that one
of the companies printing checks for North Carolina users is located in
Georgia, which adopted the Code several years ago.8 G.S. §§ 25-3-103(2), -4-102(1).
[Vol. 44
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SUMMARY OF CODE PROVISIONS
A full section-by-section commentary is not possible within the
space alloted, and any comprehensive commentary would be, to a
large extent, merely repetitive of the Article 3 provisions, the offi-
cial comments, and the North Carolina comments, all of which fill
about 122 tightly packed pages in newly published Volume 1D of
The General Statutes of North Carolina. For those who wish to
pursue a matter not considered here, the pocket supplement to the
volume offers a useful index tool not available in the Official Uni-
form Commercial Code volume published by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Over five pages of the pocket index to Volume
ID is devoted to "commercial paper."
The succeeding commentary follows a straight progression
through some of the more significant provisions of Article 3. Only
those sections containing significant changes in existing negotiable
instrument law are discussed at length, but omission of discussion
of a section does not necessarily mean that it contains no modifica-
tions to existing law.
I. FORM AND INTERPRETATION
Section 25-3-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions.-This
section not only gives definitions and citations to other definitions
in the related Articles 3 and 4 but also provides in subsection (4)
that the general definitions and principles of construction of Article
1 are applicable to Article 3.
The principle change here relates to the permissibility of using
alternative drawees. NIL section 12814 did not permit an order to
be addressed to two or more drawees in the alternative. The Code
permits this, thus recognizing current commercial practice whereby
corporations 'issuing dividend checks (and certain other drawers)
name a number of drawee banks (often in different parts of the
country)y -
Section 25-3-103. Limitations bn Scope of Article.-As pre-
viously observed, this section limits the application of Article 3 to
checks, drafts, promissory notes, and certificates of deposit. Other
types of paper are governed by other articles.
a, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-135 (1953).
" Also, subsection (1) (a) makes it clear that a remitter can take. G.S. §
25-3-102, comment 1.
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Section 25-3-104. Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft";
"Check"; "Certificate of Deposit"; "Note.'-The full text of this
fundamental statute should be studied, because only if the instru-
ment in question meets this definition does Article 3 come into
play. 6 The definition of a "negotiable instrument within this Arti-
cle" is set forth in subsection (1) (a). This definition is substantial-
ly the same as the definition of a "negotiable instrument" under
NIL section 1.7 A full comprehension of the general definition can
be attained only by a further examination of sections 25-3-105 (on
"unconditional promise or order"); -3-106 (on "sum certain");
-3-107 (on "in money") ; -3-108 (on "on demand") ; -3-109 (on
"at a definite time"); -3-110 (on "to order"); 
-3-111 (on "to
bearer"); and -3-112 (on additional promises, orders, obligations
or powers which can be included without killing negotiability under
Article 3).
An examination of the above list together with the definition in
subsection (1) (b) of section 25-3-104 reveals that the full tests for
determining whether a particular instrument is a negotiable instru-
ment under Article 3 can be determined only by reading sections
25-3-104 through 25-3-112 as a unit. Also, sections 25-3-113
(seal), 25-3-114 (date, antedating, postdating), and 25-3-119 (other
writings affecting instrument) deal in part with the problem of
whether a particular instrument is a "negotiable instrument within
this article."
Of special importance under subsection (1) (b) is the provision
that any promise or order in addition to the basic promise or order
to pay money will kill negotiability unless the additional promise
or order is expressly approved by section 25-3-112 or other sections
in Article 3. Thus, as will be noted when section 25-3-112 is com-
mented upon, the Code takes an "exclusive" approach to the ques-
tion of what additional matters may be included in an instrument
without killing its negotiability.
Section 25-3-105. When Promise or Order Unconditional.-
Two of the salutary changes of this section are:
(a) Subsection (1) (g), which permits instruments of govern-
mental units to be limited to payment from a particular fund or
"As noted earlier, G.S. § 25-3-805 permits instruments lacking the
words "order" or "bearer" to be governed by Article 3, except that there
can be no holder in due course.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7 (1953).
[Vol. 44
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source without losing their status as negotiable instruments. Usual-
ly, obligations of governmental units will be classified as investment
securities coming under Article 8; however, some limited-source
obligations may come under Article 3 as negotiable instruments.
(b) Subsection (1) (h), which states that an instrument is not
rendered non-negotiable merely because it is limited to payment
from the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association,
trust or estate by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued.
Previously it was doubtful that such instruments were negotiable,
because they were limited to payment from a particular fund.
Section 23-3-106. Sum Certain.-Perhaps the most significant
aspect of this section is its recognition that an instrument may be
negotiable even though it provides for the payment of (a) costs of
collection and (b) an attorney's fee upon a default in payment.
This is really nothing new because General Statutes section 25-8 (5),
which it replaces, also recognized that such provisions did not kill
negotiability. However, the really interesting question is whether
such reasonable agreements will be enforced.'
It is submitted that, in the absence of a clear statutory prohibi-
tion, such contractual terms should be enforceable. In North Caro-
lina, however, prior to the Code there was a prohibition that "a
provision incorporated in the instrument to pay counsel fees for col-
lection is not enforceable . . . ."' However, these prohibitory words
will not be a part of North Carolina law after the NIL becomes
inoperative on July 1, 1967.
This writer's suggestion to the North Carolina Legislative
Council in preparing the study of Article 3 was that a statute similar
to General Statutes section 6-21 be passed to permit attorney's fees
to be collected as a part of costs in suits on negotiable instruments
even though the paper did not contain an express clause permitting
such fees to be collected by the holder.2" If such a statute were
passed, most surely many persons would start honoring their bad
notes and checks. Word would soon get around that a holder could
afford to pay a lawyer to help him collect on paper that, in theory
"8 G.S. § 25-3-106(2) takes no position on the matter.
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 (1953).
" Attorney's. fees are now allowed in certain cases. See generally N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 6-21 (1965), 6-21.1 (1963), 28-170.1 (1957), and 50-16
(1955). See also 38 N.C.L. REV. 16 (1960) on attorney's fees as a part of
costs.
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at least, is supposed to be a substitute for money. Such unpaid
obligations should be collectible at face value.
Although the 1965 General Assembly did not take action to
permit the collection of attorney's fees in all suits on negotiable
instruments, this inaction does not necessarily affect collection of
attorney's fees when they are specifically contracted for. There is
some dictum in Queen City Coach Co. v. Lumberton Coach Co.2
implying that attorney's fees may be collected when contracted for.
And in the absence of any express statutory prohibition after the
repeal of General Statutes section 25-8, there is some reason to
believe that a contract for attorney's fees will be honored by the
courts.
Section 25-2-109. Definite Time.-A troublesome problem un-
der NIL section 422 was whether a note payable at a time certain
but subject to an acceleration clause was payable at a determinable
future time as required by the NIL. Some of the cases involved
acceleration clauses permitting a holder to accelerate at his will,
and the courts occasionally held that such acceleration clauses made
the time uncertain; thus the instrument was non-negotiable.
By this faulty "non-negotiable" reasoning, the courts attempted
to protect the maker of the instrument who had contracted for an
acceleration clause that was harsh to him. Better reasoned decisions,
however, took the view that the note was still negotiable, but that
the harsh acceleration clause should not be enforced.
By amendment of NIL section 4 North Carolina permitted an
acceleration clause. The amendment added: "But an instrument
payable at a determinable future time is negotiable, even though it
may mature or be declared due upon a contingency happening be-
fore such future time." 23 A similar provision is found in subsection
(1) (c) of section 25-3-109.
The amendment to NIL section 4 did not specify the effect of
a clause that gave the holder a capricious option to accelerate, and
there are no North Carolina cases on this matter.
The capricious option problem now is solved, however, by sec-
tion 25-1-208, which provides that clauses permitting a holder to
"l229 N.C. 534, 50 S.E.2d 288 (1948). There the court said attorney's
fees will not be allowed "in the absence of express agreement." Id. at 536,
50 S.E.2d at 289.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-10 (1953).20 Ibid.
[Vol. 44
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accelerate "at will," etc., will be enforced only when he acts in
"good faith." Thus, under the Code the question of "negotiability"
is separated from the independent question of "enforceability."
As explained in the official comment, subsection 25-3-109(2)
makes an important change by excluding from the operation of
Article 3 those instruments that are payable on the happening of
a certain event the time of which is uncertain.24 For example, an
instrument payable at the death of an individual (or at the end of
a war, etc.) will not be a "negotiable instrument within this article,"
for the official comment strongly states that instruments payable at
such uncertain times are not fit to be ordinary commercial paper.
Section 25-3-110. Payable to Order.-There are no important
North Carolina cases on this matter, and no real change is made in
existing law.
Section 25-3-111. Payable to Bearer.-The only important
North Carolina decisions relating to bearer paper concern the "ficti-
tious payee" problem. Further comment is made on this matter in
discussion of section 25-3-405.
Section 25-3-112. Terms and Omissions Not Affecting Nego-
tiability.-This important section sets forth the "extras" or the
so-called "permissive luggage," that may be included in an instru-
ment without killing negotiability. Subsection (2) provides, how-
ever, that the section itself does not validate any of these.
It is important to note that the extras expressly permitted by
this and other sections are the only extras that can be safely in-
cluded. If a provision not expressly approved is included, the paper
is not a "negotiable instrument within this article," even though
fair-minded judges and businessmen might agree that such a clause
was a useful addition to commercial paper. In substance, Article
3 takes the "exclusive" view of permissive luggage.
As was observed above, the fact that a paper is not a "negotiable
instrument within this article" does not necessarily preclude the
paper from being a negotiable instrument by other statutes or by
decisions. This possibility must not be overlooked when the instru-
ment in question looks negotiable but does not quite meet the defini-
tion of section 25-3-104.
A few states have seen fit to expand the list of permissives in
Code section 3-112. For example, California and Virginia have
-2 G.S. § 25-3-109, comment 1.
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added to subsection (1) (c) language permitting a promise or a
power "to furnish financial information or to do or refrain from
doing any other act for the protection of the obligations expressed
in the instrument not involving the payment of money on account
of the indebtedness evidenced by the instrument .... *"25 This modi-
fication was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board in 1962
for the reason that "it would not only move substantially away
from the 'courier without luggage' principle, but, in addition, could
produce substantial confusion and litigation."2' 6 The difference of
opinion on this matter is one of many instances where nonuniform
law has already been produced under the Code.
Subsection 25-3-112(1) (d) permitting a confession of judgment
clause is of special interest. First, the clause is harmless only if
it permits a confession after the instrument is overdue. A clause
authorizing a confession before the instrument is due probably
would kill negotiability.
Of related interest is the fact that North Carolina apparently
does not authorize an actual confession of judgment by the holder
of a note.27 Even though the holder may not be able to confess
judgment against the maker in North Carolina, the clause can be
of use if enforcement is sought in a state that does enforce such
clauses.
Section 25-3-113. Seal.-One problem resolved by this section
involves the question whether the donor of a sealed negotiable in-
strument can plead the defense of "want of consideration" when
sued by the donee. There is no North Carolina case exactly on this
point, but there is much dicta to the effect that a seal imports a
consideration.
The purpose of section 25-3-113 is to make all negotiable instru-
ments alike, seal or no seal, as far as defenses are concerned, and
"want and failure of consideration" are defenses against a non-
HDC under section 25-3-306(c). Thus, a donor would have a
defense against his donee in a suit on a sealed negotiable instrument,
"CAL. CoMM. CODE § 3112(1) (c) (1964); VA. CODE § 8.3-112(1) (c)(1964).
" 1 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, UCC REP. 73 (1963). New York
had the same language as California and Virginia in its original version of
this section but took it out of the section by amendment in 1963. N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1003, § 5.




even though he might not have such defense in a suit on a sealed
non-negotiable instrument.
The statute of limitations on a negotiable instrument under seal
will continue to be ten years for suits against the principal obligor.
Note that the ten-year period of General Statutes section 1-47 ap-
plies only to an action against the principal to the sealed instrument.
Section 25-3-115. Incomplete Instruments.-This section makes
some changes in prior law. One change is a reversal of the rule of
NIL section 15,28 which provided that an incomplete undelivered
instrument could not be enforced even by an HDC. Under subsec-
tion 25-3-115(2) an HDC can enforce an instrument even though
there has been no technical delivery by the maker or drawer.
Basically, the problem of unauthorized completions (whether of
delivered or undelivered paper) is covered by section 25-3-407 on
material alteration.
Section 25-3-116. Instruments Payable to Two or More Per-
sons.-This section in effect says that if the instrument is payable
to "A or B", either may negotiate, enforce or discharge it. If the
instrument is payable to "A and B", both must indorse in order to
negotiate it. However, since one may be authorized to sign for
the other, one person may make both signatures. Nevertheless, it
seems that even when one party is fully authorized to deal with the
instrument, there can be no technical negotiation unless both names
actually appear as indorsements.
Section 25-3-119. Other Writings Affecting Instrument.-This
section permits collateral written agreements to modify the terms
of a negotiable instrument. It does not purport to cover what parol
evidence may be introduced to modify the instrument. Hopefully,
the odd rule of Brown v. Osteen29 may be changed by this section.
The Brown case held that notes containing no acceleration clause
could not be recovered on before their stated maturity even though
a contemporaneous mortgage securing the notes clearly stated that
"a failure to pay any part of the interest, or any note or any part
thereof, when due, shall mature all the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage."
As noted in the official comment,"0 if the provision of the col-
lateral agreement relates only to acceleration for time of sale of
2
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953).
29 197 N.C. 305, 148 S.E. 434 (1929).
90 G.S. § 25-3-119, comment 3.
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security and does not state that the basic obligation in the notes is
accelerated, then the only acceleration will be of the sale of security.
In the Brozn case, however, the contemporaneous agreement in the
mortgage also clearly covered acceleration of the notes, and the
agreement could be given effect under this new section.
Section 25-3-121. Instruments Payable at a Bank.-This is one
of many sections in the Code in which alternatives have been af-
forded the states without threatening the goal of uniformity. North
Carolina chose Alternative B, which adopts the view that the pro-
vision that an instrument is payable at a named bank is neither an
order nor an authorization to the bank to pay the instrument.
Alternative A takes the position that when a note or an accep-
tance is payable at a named bank, this is the equivalent of an order
on such bank to pay the instrument. Under this "Northeastern"
view, the bank should pay its depositor's instrument when the bank
is the place of payment.
Virginia has adopted a compromise approach. In Virginia a
provision that a note be payable at a bank is not per se an order
to the bank to pay it from the maker's deposits, but "the bank may
consider it an authorization to pay."31
There is some merit to the Virginia approach. For example, if
a bank's depositor has made a note payable at the bank, and the
bank has been unable to receive instructions on whether the cus-
tomer wishes to have such note paid from his accounts, the bank is
not under a duty to pay. However, it may safely pay the instru-
ment if it believes that the customer would prefer this to a dishonor.
Section 25-3-122. Accrual of Cause of Action; Interest.-This
is an entirely new section, and in general it poses no special prob-
lems. Subsection (3), however, may have some unintended results.
At least it warrants the careful consideration of lawyers.
Subsection (3) states: "A cause of action against a drawer of
a draft or an indorser of any instrument accrues upon demand
following dishonor of the instrument. Notice of dishonor is a de-
mand."32 As is noted in the North Carolina comment on section
25-3-122, there is a possibility that the holder of an instrument is
given a power to determine when the period of limitations begins
to run against him. Surely, this is not a sound rule.
"'VA. CODE § 8.3-21 (1964).
" Emphasis added.
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II. TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION
Section 25-3-201. Tranfer; Right of Tndorsement.-The sec-
tion recognizes that a negotiation is not the only way that rights in
a negotiable instrument can be transferred. Any transfer vests in
the transferee such rights as the transferor had therein. There is
a proviso, however, that prohibits a reacquirer from improving
his position by taking from a later HDC if the reacquirer was a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or if as a
prior holder he had notice of a defense or claim against the instru-
ment. In substance, a bad faith prior holder cannot give the instru-
ment an "immunity bath" by passing it through a later HDC. Such
a reacquirer is said to "stand in his old dirty shoes." There were
some decisions under the NIL that permitted one having knowledge
of fraud in the original transaction (but not participating in it)
who transferred to an HDC and then reacquired the paper to have
the status of an HDC.
3
Subsection (3) grants to the transferee of unindorsed "order
paper" the right to the unqualified indorsement of his transferor,
provided value has been given and there is no agreement that the
transferee is not entitled such indorsement. Also, until the trans-
feree obtains the indorsement of "order paper," he is not a holder,
and consequently he cannot be an HDC. The time at which his
status as an HDC will be tested is the time that the transferee final-
ly obtains the indorsement. For this reason, an originally innocent
purchaser prior to maturity may lose his ability to become an HDC
if he acquires knowledge of a defense between the date of purchase
and the date of the later indorsement.
Section 25-3-202. Negotiation.-Because this is a key section,
the full text should be studied carefully.
Subsection (4) clarifies a sometimes worrisome matter. When
words such as "I assign this note" were added to the signature
on the back of -a negotiable instrument, it was at times difficult
for the courts to interpret their exact meaning. Did they mean that
the transfer was a mere assignment, rather than a negotiation? If
so, there was no "holder" and no HDC. Did the word "assign"
mean that the indorser was limiting his warranties to those of a
mere assignor or qualified indorser, rather than extending his war-
"8 See G.S. § 25-3-201, comment 3 (e).
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ranties to those of an unqualified indorser?" Under subsection (4)
the transfer of title is clear, but additional words may operate to
limit the transferor's liability.
Section 25-3-204. Special Indorsement; Blank Indorsement.-
Under NIL section 333" there were four general categories of in-
dorsement: (1) special or blank,"6 (2) qualified or unqualified, 7
(3) conditional or unconditional, 8 and (4) restrictive or nonre-
strictive.39
To describe fully any single indorsement, one term from each of
the four categories should be used because each deals with a differ-
ent legal effect. Under the Code, special and blank indorsements
are covered by section Z5-3-204. Restrictive and nonrestrictive are
covered by the following two sections. Coverage of conditional in-
dorsements is merged into the sections on restrictive indorsements
without any major change. Qualified indorsements are now covered
under "without recourse" provisions of sections 25-2-414(1) and
25-3-417(3)..
Section 25-3-205. Restrictive Indorsements.-Perhaps the big-
gest change here is subsection (c), which states that restrictive
indorsements include those that contain words like "for collection,"
"for deposit," "pay any bank or banker," or other terms signifying
a purpose of deposit or collection. Under the NIL there was con-
siderable difference of opinion as to the effect of these words.
Section 25-3-206. Effect of Restrictive Indorsement.--This sec-
tion completely revises the NIL, and the official comments should
be examined carefully. Generally, the section lessens the restric-
tions of a restrictive indorsement.
Subsection (1) reverses the NIL rule that "Pay A only" or
similar words would prevent a further negotiation. Under the new
provisions, an instrument may be further negotiated despite the
presence of such words in the indorsement.
Subsection (3) changes NIL section 39 by permitting an in-
' Evans v. Freeman, 142 N.C. 70, 54 S.E. 847 (1906), held that an
indorsement with the added words, "I assign all my right, title and interest,"
was an unqualified indorsement.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-39 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-40 (1953).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-44 (1953).
'8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-45 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-42 (1953).
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dorsee under a restrictive indorsement to be an HDC free of the
indorser's claim if certain requirements are met.
Section 25-3-207. Negotiation Effective Although It May Be
Rescinded.-Basically, this section helps to expand the negotiability
of instruments. For example, subsection (1) permits a negotiation
to be effective even though (a) made by a person without capacity,
(b) there was fraud or duress, (c) the negotiation was part of an
illegal transaction, or (d) the negotiation was in breach of duty.
Subsection (2) recognizes that the injured party may have some
remedy against other parties, but not against an HDC.
Section 25-3-208. Reacquisition.-The most important part of
this section relates to the discharge of intervening parties after an
instrument has been reacquired by a prior owner. The rights of the
reacquirer himself were mentioned in the comment on section 25-3-
201.
III. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER
Section 25-3-301. Rights of a Holder.-Hopefully, this section
will legislatively overrule the opinion of First Nat'l Bank v. Rocha-
mora,4° which said that, because of the real-party-in-interest statute
in North Carolina,4 an agent could not enforce an instrument of
which he is the holder. This ruling, which was really not neces-
sary to the determination of the case, has plagued students, pro-
fessors, and practitioners for many years, and the Code should put
it to rest. The latest expression of legislative intent is that any
holder, whether he be agent or owner, may enforce payment in his
own name. Of course, this does not mean that a mere agent will
be free of defenses against the agent's principal.
Section 25-3-302. Holder in Due Course.-By a few clarifying
additions this section somewhat broadens the tests for HDC status.
For example, it is now made clear that a payee can be an HDC if
he meets the usual tests. To obtain a full appreciation of the new
provisions, this section should be considered in conjunction with
section 25-3-303 (taking for value) and section 25-3-304 (notice
to purchasers).
A major change eliminates the requirement of NIL section 52
that one must take an instrument "complete and regular on its
40 193 N.C. 1, 136 S.E. 259 (1927) (criticized in 5 N.C.L. REv. 369
(1927)).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
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face" in order to be an HDC. Under the Code incompleteness and
irregularity are considered only as a subdivision of the primary test
of "notice." Also, subsection (2) specifically states that a payee
may be an HDC.
Section 25-3-303. Taking for Value.-One change, academic
perhaps, makes it clear that in order for one to be an HDC, he must
have himself given value. He cannot "tack" his own good faith to
a prior holder's value.
The troublesome problem of when bank credit is value is not
covered by this section but is left to the more specific banking pro-
visions of section 25-4-209.
Section 25-3-304. Notice to Purchaser.-The official comment
on this significant section is extensive and should be considered in
any analysis of the subject.
One significant change relates to the previously mentioned "com-
plete and regular" requirement for HDC status. Under subsection
(1) (a), incompleteness will give notice of a claim or defense only
if the instrument is "so incomplete" as to raise a question about its
validity. Though this liberalizing language may produce increased
litigation, minor omissions are no longer death to HDC standing.
There appears to be some conflict between subsection (2) cover-
ing the consequences of taking from a fiduciary and certain sections
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.42
Section 25-3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course.-Covered
by this section are the rights of both an HDC in his own right and
one who is a derivative HDC under section 25-3-201.
An important change is made to the rule of NIL section 15,
which did not permit an HDC to recover from one who had signed
incomplete and undelivered paper. Now, however, if such paper
is stolen and negotiated to an HDC, the HDC can recover. Thus,
the liability of one who signs such paper is increased.
Even an HDC is subject to certain so-called "real defenses"'
and these are listed in subsection (2).
Section 25-3-306. Rights of One Not a Holder in Due Course.
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-5 to -7 (1950). The official comments, however,
declare that the Code follows the policy of this act. G.S. § 25-3-305, com-
ment 5.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953).
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-Basically, the rules are about the same as under the NIL and the
North Carolina decisions.
Section 25-3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures, Defenses
and Due Course.-Here the rules of procedure are simplified by
omitting some of the fictitional "presumptions" that were used under
the NIL. The official comment 4  notes that one who is not a holder,
but who is in possession of the instrument, must prove his right
to it and must account for the absence of any indorsement.
IV. LIABILITY OF PARTIES
The nineteen sections of this part set forth the liabilities of
various parties to the instrument. Sections 25-3-401 through 25-
3-406 are on signatures. The provisions of section 25-3-407 on
alterations to the instrument are especially important.
Section 25-3-403. Signature by Authorized Representative.-
Subsection (1) permits a party's name to be signed by another
when authorized. The person whose name is so signed becomes
liable on the instrument. Subsection (2) (a) makes an authorized
representative personally liable when neither his representative
capacity nor the name of his principal appears on the instrument.
Also, a representative runs a risk of personal liability under sub-
section (2) (b) when only one of these appears on the instrument.
Thus there is danger in not revealing the name of a principal. This
risk is accentuated when it is remembered that the principal whose
name is not on the instrument is not "liable on the instrument"
under section 25-3-401 (1).
Section 25-3-404. Unauthorized Signatures.-Under this sec-
tion an unauthorized signature is generally not operative as the
signature of the person whose name appears. However, it is opera-
tive as the signature of the person who makes the unauthorized
signature. Furthermore, one whose signature has been wrongfully
made may ratify such signature or he may be precluded from deny-
ing that it is authorized.
Because tle question of authorization is a matter not appearing
on the face of the instrument, suit on a possibly unauthorized signa-
ture should include as defendants both the party who did the sign-
ing and the party whose name was signed.
Section 25-3-405. Imposters; Signature in Name of Payee.-
"G.S. § 25-3-307, comment 2.
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This section codifies the better decisions relating to "imposters"
and "payroll padders." Under the NIL, these problems were solved
usually by the fiction of the "fictitious payee doctrine." By this
certain instruments payable to the order of persons not intended to
have any interest in the instrument were classified as "bearer" paper,
which could be negotiated by a delivery alone without the indorse-
ment of the named payee who was not intended to have any interest
in the item.
Under the Code, the drawer or maker of a note who has let him-
self be swindled out of an instrument by an imposter or a defraud-
ing payroll clerk will still bear the loss as against his drawee or an
innocent purchaser, but the technique to produce this proper result
is different. Under the new technique:
(1) an instrument issued in the name of a payee not intended
to have an interest does not become mere bearer paper;
(2) a purportedly regular indorsement is required;
(3) however, any person may indorse in the name of the named
payee.
Since the section is limited to the signatures of "payees," there
may be some question of its applicability when the imposter has
the sucker indorse a paper to him pretending that it is for an
indorsee not intended to have any interest in the item. The follow-
ing section may cover this problem.
Section 25-3-406. Negligenwe Contributing to Alteration or Un-
authorized Signature.-The long-recognized effect of negligence is
hereby codified. Note that this section differs from the prior one
in which negligence is not required in order to charge the defrauded
party. Note, also, that the liability here is not in tort but on the
instrument by the "precluded" theory. Can a party damaged by
the negligence of another also sue in tort? Such may be the only
remedy of a bona fide purchaser who does not quite meet the techni-
cal definition of an HDC.
Section 25-3-407. Alteration.--7-The official comment to this im-
portant section should be studied to appreciate fully its coverage.
Basically, it combines in one section the former rules of incomplete
instruments45 and materially altered instruments.46
The old rule which did not make liable the signer of an incom-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-20 (1953).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-131 (1953).
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plete and undelivered instrumen4 has been reversed. The signer
of such paper is now liable on the instrument.
Section 25-3-408. Consideration.-Like the NIL, Article 3 con-
tinues to distinguish consideration and value. Consideration is con-
cerned with what the obligor received, and it pertains to whether
he has a defense of lack of consideration. By contrast, value per-
tains to what a purchaser has given in order to be a taker for value.
Value is the element required for HDC status. No major change
is made in North Carolina law.
Section 25-3-409. Draft Not an Assignment.-This continues
the prior rule that a check or other draft does not per se operate as
an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee ;48 and the
drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it.
Section 25-3-410. Definition and Operation of Acceptance.-
Probably the most important change is that all acceptances must be
on the instrument. Under the prior law49 an acceptance could be on
a separate paper.
Though an acceptance must be on the draft, the section is not
intended to eliminate the liability of a drawee in contract, in tort or
otherwise arising from a separate writing or from any other obliga-
tion or representation.
Subsection (1) eliminates the provisions of NIL section 137'o
on constructive acceptance when the drawee destroys the instrument
or refuses to return it within twenty-four hours after receipt. How-
ever, under section 25-3-419, the drawee is liable for conversion.
Section 25-3-411. Certification of a Check.-Subsection (1)
continues the rule of NIL section 188"' that the obtaining of certifi-
cation of a check by the drawer leaves him liable as a secondary
party, while the obtaining of certification by a holder discharges the
drawer and all prior indorsers.
Section 25-3-412. Acceptance Varying Draft.-Drawees do not
often accept in a manner that varies the draft, but there are a few
changes from prior law not justifying comment here.
Section 25-3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor.-
No real change in substance is made, but the section should be
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953).
48 See 13 N.C.L. REv. 131 (1934) and 31 N.C.L. Rtv. 190 (1953) as to
what constitutes an assignment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-141, -142 (1953).
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-144 (1953).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-196 (1953).
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read in conjunction with other sections cited in the official comment.
Section 25-3-414. Contract of Indorser; Order of Liability.-
The contract of an indorser is to pay the instrument if there is a
dishonor and if any necessary notice and protest are properly made.
This contractual obligation attaches whether or not the indorser is
also a transferor. If, as is usual, the indorser is also a transferor,
he is subject to the warranty obligations of section 25-3-417 cover-
ing "warranties on presentment and transfer." Thus, this section
and section 25-3-417 must be read together to determine the full
liability of the typical transferor-indorser.
A transferor-indorser may eliminate his contract to pay by in-
dorsing "without recourse" or by otherwise indicating that he does
not agree to pay the instrument. Furthermore, by use of the words
"without recourse," the transferor can also slightly limit his war-
ranties under section 25-3-417(3).
Section 25-3-415. Contract of Accommodation Party.-As un-
der existing law, an accommodation party is liable on the instrument
even though he receives no consideration and even though he is
known to be a mere accommodation party. He is not liable, how-
ever, to the party being accommodated, and if he pays the instru-
ment, he is given a right of recourse on the instrument against such
accommodated party.
Section 25-3-416. Contract of Guarantor.-This new section
states the usual commercial rule that one who adds words of guaran-
ty to his signature is immediately liable upon default in payment, and
the holder need not resort to any other party. Some change may
be made from prior North Carolina decisions on the question of
whether presentment was necessary to charge a surety or a guaran-
tor.5 
2
It is submitted that this section should not supersede the pro-
visions of General Statutes section 26-7 permitting a guarantor to
request a creditor to take diligent action against the principal, with
the requesting guarantor's being discharged to the extent he is
prejudiced if the creditor refuses or fails to take action. 3
Section 25-3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.-
Here certain warranties are thrust upon one who transfers an instru-
ment or presents it for payment. As previously noted in the com-
" See Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N.C. 557, 53 S.E. 430 (1906); Dry v.
Reynolds, 205 N.C. 571, 172 S.E. 351 (1934).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 26-9 (1953).
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ment on section 25-3-414, the warranties of a transferor can be
slightly limited by use of the words "without recourse." By using
such words, the transferor eliminates his warranty that there are
no defenses against him and merely warrants that he knows of no
such defenses.
Closely related to this section is section 25-4-207 governing the
warranties of a customer and a collecting bank on the transfer or
presentment of claims in the bank collection process.
Section 25-3-418. Finality of Payment and Acceptance.-Basi-
cally, this restatement of prior rules follows the rule of the leading
case of Price v. Neal 4 which decided that when a drawee pays an
instrument containing the forged name of the drawer, the drawee
cannot recover back the money from the recipient of the funds. As
the great exception to the usual rule that money paid by mistake
can be recovered, the decision is justified on the grounds that the
mistake is primarily that of the drawee, who is in a superior position
to know the drawer's signature.
The section clearly states that payment is final only when made
to an HDC or a person who has in good faith changed his position
in reliance on the payment. This may be a change from prior law.
Section 25-3-419. Conversion of the Instrument; Innocent Rep-
resentation.-A party who refuses to return an instrument is liable
as a convertor for the face amount of the instrument. Thus, the
liability of a wrongdoing drawee will be the same as if there had
been a constructive acceptance under prior law. Constructive ac-
ceptance has been eliminated under section 25-3-410. Again, we see
about the same results, but technically different reasoning.
V. PRESENTMENT, NOTICE OF DISHONOR, AND PROTEST
The eleven sections in this part deal with the details of the
conditions precedent to the liability of secondary parties (usually
drawers and indorsers). Though there has been a considerable
streamlining of prior law, there are few fundamental changes. Gen-
erally, Part 5 eliminates some of the technicalities of presentment,
notice of dishonor and protest, and it simplifies others.
Section 25-3-501. When Presentment, Notice of Dishonor, and
Protest Necessary or Permissible-Though presentment, notice of
dishonor and protest are usually necessary to charge a secondary
" 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
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party, they may be excused. This section states when they are
necessary, and section 25-3-511 indicates when they are excused.
One of the interesting aspects of this section is that it broadens
the class of secondary parties to include some parties not usually
thought of as being in this class. Typically, drawers and indorsers
are the only secondary parties whose liability is conditional on
timely presentment, notice of dishonor and protest. However, be-
cause instruments payable at a bank are in many jurisdictions the
equivalent of an order to the bank, 5 some parties normally con-
sidered as primary parties are shifted to secondary status.
For example, consider the maker of a note or the acceptor of a
draft. Normally, these parties have contracted "to pay," not to "pay
if someone else does not." Thus, they are usually so-called primary
parties. If, however, the note or the accepted draft is payable at a
bank, section 25-3-121 comes into play. And under Alternative A,
adopted in many states, such an instrument becomes the equivalent
of a draft or order to the bank to pay the instrument from funds
of the maker or acceptor."
Since, the instrument payable at the bank is the equivalent of
a draft, the maker or acceptor now occupies the position of a mere
secondary party. Consequently, section 25-3-501 provides that pre-
sentment for payment and notice of dishonor are necessary in order
to charge "the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank or the maker
of a note payable at a bank."
Does this rule apply in North Carolina even though the state
has rejected Alternative A and has adopted Alternative B stating
that the provision that the instrument is payable at a bank does not
amount to an order or an authorization to pay? The answer to
this question is found, not in section 25-3-501, but in subsection
25-3-511(2) which provides:
Presentment or notice or protest as the case may be is entirely
excused when
(b) such party has himself dishonored the instrument or has
countermanded payment or otherwise has no reason to expect or
right to require that the instrument be accepted or paid ....
Because an instrument payable at a bank is not an order to the
bank under the North Carolina version of Code section 3-121, any
" See G.S. § 25-3-121, N.C. comment.
" See discussion of G.S. § 25-3-121 supra.
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dishonor will be by the maker or the acceptor, and the above-quoted
"entirely excused" clause will apply.
Section 25-3-502. Unexcused Delay; Discharge.-Certain sec-
ondary parties are discharged by unexcused delay in presentment
and notice of dishonor. An indorser is fully discharged, but a
drawer, the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank, and the maker
of a note payable at a bank are discharged only in special situations
as provided by subsection (1) (b). Also, failure to make a neces-
sary protest -will discharge a drawer or an indorser.
Section 25-3-503. Time of Presentment.-In addition to general
time provisions, the section contains two new provisions giving
specific times within which presentment of an uncertified check must
be made. Subsections (2) (a) and (2) (b) provide that, as against
a drawer of an uncertified check, presentment must be made within
thirty days after date of issue or stated date, whichever is later;
against an indorser, presentment must be made within seven days
after his indorsement. Since late presentment grants a full discharge
to an indorser under the preceding section, the holder of an un-
certified check must make a prompt presentment to hold the indorser.
Section 25-3-504. How Presentment Made.-The rules on the
methods of presentment are here simplified. If an item is to be
collected through the banking process, section 25-4-210 should also
be consulted.
Section 25-3-505. Rights of the Party to Whom Presentment
Is Made.-This expanded and modified version of NIL section 74
should be read in conjunction with section 25-3-804 (lost, de-
stroyed or stolen instruments). Clearly, such instruments cannot be
presented in the usual manner, and since one of the presentee's
rights is exhibition of the instrument, the owner of a lost or de-
stroyed instrument may be forced to bring action as provided for
in section 25-3-804.
Section 25-3-506. Time Allowed For Acceptance or Payment.
-The person to whom presentment is made for acceptance usually
has until the close of the next business day after presentment to
decide what he will do. When an item is presented for payment,
payment must be made by the end of the business day on which
presentment is made; otherwise there is a dishonor. If presentment
is made to a bank, the deferred posting provisions of section 25-4-
301 will modify the terms of this section.
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Section 25-3-509, Protest; Noting For Protes.-The mechanics
of protest are simplified. Also, protest is not required except. on
drafts drawn or payable outside of the United States.5"
Section 25-3-511. Waiver and Excused Presentment, Protest
or Notice of Dishonor or Delay Therein.-Here in one section are
combined many rambling provisions of the NIL. In reading the
section, it is important to distinguish between "excused" and "en-
tirely excused." In commercial practice, this section will be quite
important, and a careful study is suggested. When a client has not
made the normal presentment and notice of dishonor, this section
may keep him from having inadvertently granted discharges to
other parties.
VI. DISCHARGE
The six sections of this part provides several methods by which
the various parties to a negotiable instrument are discharged from
liability on the instrument or other than on the instrument.
Section 25-3-601. Discharge Of Parties.-Throughout Article
3 are scattered sections dealing with the discharge of a party from
liability on the instrument. Subsection (1) of this section contains
a convenient index to these other provisions.
Section 25-3-602. Effect of Discharge Against Holder in Due
Course.-While a holder may be an HDC under section 25-3-
304(1) (b) even when he knows of the discharge of some parties,
this section in a negative sort of way provides that the HDC can-
not hold such parties liable.
Section 25-3-603. Payment or Satisfaction.-Subsection (1)
changes existing law by eliminating the requirement of NIL sec-
tion 8858 that a payor is discharged by payment only if he makes
payment at a time when he does not know of adverse claims to the
instrument. The payor now is relieved of worrying about other
parties' squabbles unless the claimant supplies adequate indemnity
to the payor, or the claimant enjoins payment.- Thus, th- burden of
taking action to prevent payment is placed on the adverse claimant.
In two situations, howeyer, a payor will not be discharged when
he makes a payment, even though he has not been indemnified or
enjoined:
57 Thus the inland-foreign bill of exchange distinction dies. See NIL §
129, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-136 (1953).
" N.C. GEaN. STAT. § 25-95 (1953).
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(a) when he in bad faith pays one who has taken through a
thief (unless the taker has the rights of an HDC) ; or
(b) when he pays contrary to the terms of a restrictive in-
dorsement.
Subsection (2) permits a stranger to pay an instrument with
the consent of the holder, and the person who so pays will be given
the rights of a transferee when the instrument is surrendered to
him. There seems to be no sound reason for not affording the same
privilege to one who pays with the consent of the owner, even
though the owner may not be a holder.
Section 25-3-604. Tender of Payment.-Subsection (1) is a
new provision partially discharging one who makes full tender. Such
a party is discharged of all subsequent liability for interest, costs,
and attorney's fees.
Section 25-3-605. Cancellation and Renunciation.-This section
apparently will continue the rule of Page Trust Co. v. Lewis 9 that
a verbal renunciation is ineffectual. A renunciation must be in
writing.
Section 25-3-606. Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral.-By
this section a holder may discharge secondary parties when without
the parties' consent the holder releases his rights against certain
persons or property. However, the holder may preserve certain rights
by an express reservation of these rights. There seems to be no
good reason for limiting these rules to holders.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
Of the five sections in Part 8, all but the first are new provisions
not found in the NIL. They restate in code form rules that have
developed by decision alone or by legislation other than the NIL.
Section 25-3-801. Drafts in a Set.-Drafts in a set are not
widely used in domestic commerce, and the matter does not justify
summarization here. -
Section 25-3-802. Effect of Instritment on- Obligation for which
it is Given.-This important section probably changes some prior
North Carolina case law. Under the new rules, if the item given
in payment is an item drawn or accepted by a bank, such as a
cashier's check or a certified check, the underlying obligor is dis-
"200 N.C. 286, 156 S.E. 504 (1931).
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charged pro tanto on the underlying obligation, and he is not liable
on the instrument if the bank fails to honor it.
When any other instrument is given in payment, the under-
lying obligation is suspended 6° pro tanto until the instrument is
due. If the instrument is dishonored, action may be maintained
either on the instrument or on the underlying obligation. The dis-
charge of an obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the
underlying obligation. This probably means a pro tanto discharge.
Section 25-3-803. Notice to Third Party.-This procedural sec-
tion permits a party defendant to give notice of a pending suit to
any person that may be liable to the joined defendant. A full scale
"vouching in" of parties defendant is not authorized. However a
limited type of vouching in is approved to give the joined defendant
the privilege of pleading res judicata on some issues in a later suit
against the notified party.
Section 25-3-804. Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instrument.-
There may be a good reason for limiting the right of recovery to
the owner, but there may be some reason to let a mere collection
agent recover in order to protect himself and his principal.
Section 25-3-805.-Instruments Not Payable to Order or Bear-
er.-As earlier noted, an instrument that has all of the attributes of
a negotiable instrument within this article except that it lacks the
words "order" or "bearer" will be subject to all of the rules of
Article 3, except there can be no HDC.6'
CONCLUSION
Article 3 and its modernization of the NIL have not been a
particularly controversial matter. Nearly everyone agrees that it
does a reasonably good job of streamlining the law of commercial
paper. Most of us will not have to unlearn too much, and research
will be considerably simplified.
"o See G.S. § 25-3-802, N.C. comment, for discussion of a possible
ambiguity in the new "suspension" rule.
Cl See G.S. § 25-3-805, comment.
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